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1 Introduction
On the face of it, access to unfettered credit seems like a good thing. It offers households much-
needed flexibility in managing their consumption over time, allowing them to better smooth
income or consumption shocks.1 However, when households make “mistakes” – underestimate
their future interest payments or fail to commit themselves to a plan of steady repayment – the
future costs of borrowing can outweigh the initial benefits and hurt them, even from an ex-
ante perspective. Models of time-inconsistent, hyperbolic preferences (Laibson,1997) have been
used to explain this sort of faulty consumer borrowing.2 Individuals with these preferences will
at times choose to borrow (or borrow “too much”) even when they know, or have a sense, they
shouldn’t. They borrow under the “flawed” assumption that they will repay the loan at some
date, but cannot commit to this plan.3 To some, this suggests a role for policy intervention,
perhaps a policy that constrains such individuals’ consumption in the current period by, say,
removing or curtailing a source of credit. This paper investigates and formalizes the above dis-
cussed tension, between an unfettered and a controlled credit regime, in a lifecycle model with
time-inconsistent agents. It uses the structure to ask, when is policy intervention desirable? And
if so, when is it most effective?
These questions are not merely of theoretical interest. They lie at the heart of the academic
debate surrounding the creation and functioning of the CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau) in the U.S. in the years after the 2007-8 financial crisis, a crisis that caused panic and
long-lasting financial turmoil around the world. A major contributory factor for this crisis was
“too much borrowing”: borrowers were able to borrow more than ever before as lenders ap-
proved “no documentation” loans which did not require verification of a borrower’s income and
assets.4 A lot changed with the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act and the subsequent creation of the CFPB,
specifically its ability-to-repay rule which mandated lenders to verify that their loan recipients
have the financial means to pay back. Also added was the mandatory “know before you owe”
disclosures that inform borrowers how much they need to budget for their loan payments be-
fore they sign on the dotted line. While the CFPB is generally considered a success (there is vast
1Historically, in the first half of post war U.S., institutional actors were mainly in charge of managing the financial
affairs of American households. Subsequently, as Ryan et al. (2011) point out, a “do-it-yourself” style of consumer
finance [emerged], by which consumers were not only allowed to make financial choices, but were also frequently
forced to make financial choices.”
2There is a fair bit of evidence linking hyperbolic preferences to overborrowing. Gathergood (2012) finds among
U.K. consumers, “over-indebtedness, measured both as delinquency on repayments and self-reported financial dis-
tress, occurs disproportionately among individuals who report self-control problems.” See also Xiao and Porto (2019)
for similar findings from Chinese data.
3Ryan et al. (2011) point to the fact that in the U.S. in the 1960s, installment credit with fixed repayment terms was
steadily replaced by revolving credit which permitted borrowers to customize the repayment (including the emer-
gence of lowminimum payments). “By the 1980s, requiredminimummonthly payments were dramatically reduced,
such that a consumer could literally finance a dinner at a restaurant over a period of years.” This is precisely how
present bias entered the picture.
4We are not suggesting that behavioral mistakes are the only factor explaining the dramatic increase in indebted-
ness of Americans. Some of the blame, of course, goes to regulation: “an explicit national goal of greater homeown-
ership generated bipartisan support for mortgage subsidies” and the many tax susidies that followed.
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support for it from the general public), there is also little doubt that the regulations it introduced
made it harder for many people, including “sound borrowers”, to get loans.
This paper offers a stylized recreation of this debate. It studies a lifecycle model that cap-
tures the essence of the natural life-cycle pattern of borrowing and saving: borrowing as young,
saving asmiddle-aged, and dissaving as old. We employ ideas about present-biasedness and as-
sociated self-awareness popular in the literature. From Laibson (1997), we adopt the notion that
individuals are comprised of multiple selves, possibly in conflict with one another: there may
be disagreements – preference reversal – between the preferences of the current young self and
her future selves. Time-inconsistent preferences (quasi-hyperbolic discounting) help explain
the gap between what the current, decision-making self wishes a future self to save and what
that self, when her turn to decide arrives, actually does. Much depends on the self-awareness
of the current self. Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), we allow for partial naivete (so-
phistication) where the current self has beliefs about the time preference of future selves that
are, in principle, different from the actual preference of the latter. This means the agent is aware
she will have to wrestle with self-control problems in the future but is not fully aware of their
magnitude. The more aware the young self is of the impending preference reversal, the more
sophisticated she is, and the stronger her desire to protect the consumption possibilities of her
future selves.
In such a setting, we start by studying activities in a complete (“unfettered”) credit market,
CMhenceforth. Here, an agent can borrow “any” amount shewishes at the goingmarket interest
rate and every loan is repaid on time. The fully naive youngmistakenly believes she has full buy-
in from her future selves and decides on what she thinks is the optimal path of saving. The
sophisticated young, on the other hand, realizes her middle-aged self would deviate from this
path and consume too much (save too little for old age). To “correct” this, she could raise her
own saving, raising middle-aged wealth, allowing the middle-aged to partly indulge her present
bias. The problem is, a lot of this increased wealth could end up consumed by the middle-aged
and only a small portion passed on as higher wealth to the old. From the perspective of the
sophisticated young, the latter effect is desirable but not the former. In short, the simultaneous
reduction of middle-age consumption and increase of old-age consumption, while desirable
for the young self, is not possible under the one tool she has at her disposal, her youthful asset
holding. The upshot is that while the young agent most prefers her preferred solution – the first
best – she cannot achieve it sans further intervention because of the innate time inconsistency.
And this is true even if the agent is fully sophisticated.
In a stylized fashion, this represents the world before the advent of the CFPB. The market
lends toomuch, borrowers borrow toomuch, and the first best is unattainable. We go on to study
a world that roughly corresponds to life after the CFPB’s regulations – especially the ability-to-
repay rule – are in place. Specifically, we explore a setting à la Kehoe and Levine (1993), Zhang
(1997) and Azariadis and Lambertini (2003) in which loan repayment is strategic and, therefore,
not assured. Hence, creditors allow an individual to borrow up to a limit (“endogenous borrow-
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ing constraint”, hereafter EBC) that is in her interest to repay, or parenthetically, what the lender
deems is the borrower’s ability to repay.5
Clearly, in this setup, not everyone will be allowed to borrow; even those who are will not be
granted as big a loan as they would have received in the CM world. But recall, the problem in
the CM world was that, even a fully sophisticated agent, armed solely with own saving as the
only tool under her belt, could do little to curb the excesses of her future selves. Here, under
the EBC regime, she gets some assistance from the market. Strikingly, we find that if agents are
sufficiently risk averse, the welfare of some naive and some partially sophisticated agents under
the EBC regime may be higher than in the CM world. In a stylized way, this offers theoretical
endorsement of the CFPB. Yes, some “sound borrowers” do not get credit, and some borrowers
do not get as much credit as they would have under the lax pre-CFPB world, but for many, the
ability-to-repay rule on lenders (hence, an EBC on borrowers) in the post-CFPB world offers
much needed help with their own fight with time-inconsistency.
Beyond the ability-to-repay mandate, what can (and should) governments do? Given the
young are natural borrowers and the middle-aged, savers, it is conceivable a policy that taxes
the latter and transfers to the former (and the old) could help curb the overborrowing of the
middle-aged and prevent underconsumption by the old. Such a policy would be consistent
with the thinking in Boldrin and Montes (2005), Bishnu (2013), Wang (2014) and Bishnu et al.
(2020) where time consistent agents in an imperfect credit market world benefit from a joint
institutional arrangement (connecting education expenses when young and pension payouts
when old). Such an arrangement acts as a stand-in for the missing (education) loan market
and can replicate the complete market allocations. By way of contrast, in our setup with time
inconsistent agents and perfect credit markets, this insight no longer holds: private agents fully
offset any such tax-transfer intervention by changing their own asset holdings and, hence, are
powerless – see Andersen and Bhattacharya (2019) – at preventing the middle-aged from revis-
ing plans set by the young. We go on to show that, all else same, if these agents were instead in
the EBC world, the borrowing constraints therein would successfully restrict overborrowing by
the middle-aged de facto forcing the agents to follow the first best path their entire life.6
While the literature on present-bias and partial naivete in the context of saving and credit
markets is vast (see Tanaka and Murooka (2012) and Beshears et al. (2018)), to the best of our
knowledge, there isn’t much written on the beneficial role played by credit market frictions in
helping consumers with their self control problems.7 For sure, we know how demand for com-
5There is, by now, a substantial literature on behavioral contract theory (Koszegi, 2014) that studies the ability of
firms (lenders) to exploit the naivete of consumers by offering certain contracts that encourage overborrowing. We
do not take up this issue here.
6Krueger and Perri (2001) are interested in studying if tax policy designed to reduce income (and hence, consump-
tion) riskmay worsen the samewhen private insurance contracts are unenforceable in the spirit of Kehoe and Levine
(1993). The idea is the following. If agents default on their private debt, they are excluded from consumption smooth-
ing via the market. In their setup, as in Andolfatto and Gervais (2006), taxes and transfers can lessen the blow from
being excluded and worsen the enforeceability of private contracts. For an updated look at this issue, see Broer et al.
(2017).
7Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2010) study a setting in which partially sophisticated consumers overborrow, pay the
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mitment assets arise in environments where agents face self control problems. Here, such pri-
vate commitment assets and technologies are absent: we showhow themarket in the EBCworld,
with the help of an outside agency such as the CFPB, can act as a stand-in for their absence.
There is a deeper point here. If such private commitment assets were present and being traded
at a positive price, some agents would use valuable resources to invest in them thereby shrink-
ing their consumption possibilities. Themarket, via agencies like the CPFB, economizes on such
expenses by generating the commitment publicly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the primitives of the model
economy and defines notions of present bias and sophistication. Section 3 studies optimal allo-
cations in the complete credit markets setting while Section 4 studies the same in the economy
with endogenous borrowing constraints. Section 5 compares welfare in the two settings and
Section 6 explores the role of government policy. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
The appendix contains some proofs and accompanying discussion.
2 Themodel
2.1 Primitives
We consider a simple, three-period lifecycle model so as to capture the essence of the natural
life-cycle pattern: borrowing as young (y), saving as middle-aged (m) and dissaving as old (o).
At times below, we refer to these phases of the lifecycle as selves. There is no within-cohort
heterogeneity of any kind. The population size stays fixed. This is a small, open economy with a
fixed interest rate,R > 1; loanable funds are available at this rate. A representative agent is born
with an endowment profile (!y; !m; !o) 2 <3+. There is also a governmental authority whose
actions, described further below, will conform roughly to that of the CFPB.
Any agent born in period t draws utility from (cy; cm; co), denoting consumption in youth,
middle age and old age, respectively. Following Laibson (1997), the preferences when young are
given as
(1) U (cy; cm; co) = u (cy) +  [u (cm) + u (co)] ;
whenmiddle aged as
(2) U(cm; co) = u (cm) + u (co) ;
requisite penalties, and back load repayment, thereby suffering a welfare loss. They find that not allowing lenders to
impose large penalties for deferring small amounts of repayment, in line with current practice in the U.S. credit-card
and mortgage markets, can improve welfare. In their setup, unlike in ours, a defaulter may re-enter the contract by
paying a penalty.
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and when old as
(3) U (co) = u (co) ;
where  2 [0; 1] and u () is a strictly increasing, concave function and is twice continuously
differentiable. For much of what follows, we assume a CES form:
(4) u (x) =
x1 
1   ;  > 0:
The commonly-agreed yardstick for welfare is U (cy; cm; co) ; the lifetime utility of the young self.
This is the criterion used by the government as well.
2.2 Present bias
Notice, the subjective discount factor used by the young to compare middle and old age payoffs
is  2 (0; 1) : However, the subjective discount factor used by the middle self to compare those
same payoffs is  <  where  2 (0; 1) : If  2 (0; 1), the agent engages in quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. Intuitively, she has limited patience at the start and shows a preference for living in
the present; but she still values patience and expects to bemore patient in the future. measures
the degree of time inconsistency: as  ! 1; time inconsistency disappears. In other words, these
preferences embed the special case of standard, exponential discounting when  = 1: This is
what O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) call the “present-bias effect”.
2.3 Sophistication and naivete
Is the agent aware of her impending time inconsistency? The literature usually studies the polar
cases, sophisticated (naive) agents who are fully aware (totally unaware). To incorporate more
generality, we follow O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and allow agents to be partially sophisti-
cated: they are aware of the time inconsistency of their future selves but are unsure about the
magnitude of the problem. Specifically, the young self expects themiddle self to use the discount
factor E (We use the superscript, E; to denote the expectation formalized by the young self.)
and E is a weighted average of the correct discount factor, , and the one the naive young self
expects, , i.e.,
E  [ + (1  )] ;  2 [0; 1](5)
full naive: 
fully sophisticated: 
where  is a measure of her sophistication level. When agents are partially sophisticated, the
young self believes that themiddle self will use a discount factor E to make decisions, when in
fact, the middle self will make her decisions based on . In a sense,  is a measure of the young
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self’s “behavioral flaw”; the lower  is, the worse the flaw. (Alternatively,  is a measure of her
“ignorance” of her true future selves.) The agent is fully naive when  = 0 (E = 1), partially
sophisticated when  2 (0; 1) (E 2 (; 1)) and fully sophisticated when  = 1 (E = ). In the
language of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999),  is a measure of the “sophistication effect”, which
as they point out, is clearly distinct from the present-bias effect. Fully naive people, for instance,
are influenced solely by the present-bias effect.
A quick reminder beforewe go on. Agentswithin a cohort are identical, meaning, specifically,
there is no heterogeneity in either  or : In places below, we may be loose in our exposition
and use phrases such as “this result holds for agents with  < ~; those who are sufficiently
present biased”. What we will mean is “this result holds for a -economy, one where every agent
is sufficiently present biased having been endowed with a  < ~”.
3 Economywith completemarkets
In a complete-markets economy, all agents can access a capitalmarket where the gross return on
borrowing and saving isR (> 1), exogenously given. Any borrowing or saving is for consumption
purposes only. Denoting agents’ financial assets in youth and middle age by (ay; am), the life-
cycle per-period budget constraints for an agent are
cy + ay = !y;(6)
cm + am = !m + ayR;(7)
co = !o + amR;(8)
where ay and am are allowed to be negative. The intertemporal budget constraint under com-
plete markets is
cy +
cm
R
+
co
R2
= !y +
!m
R
+
!o
R2
 Y:
This means ay 2
  !y   !m=R  !o=R2; !y. That is the young cannot borrow more than the
present value of thewhole lifecycle income and can save atmost up to the amount of the present
endowment !y. Similarly, given an ay; am 2 (ayR  !m   !o=R; !m + ayR) : These constitute
natural limits on borrowing/saving arising purely from the model restriction that all debts be
cleared by the time the three periods are up.8 No lender restricts debt as long as these minimal
natural limits are met. As such, one can think of this economy as representing the pre-CPFB
scenario.
Even in this setting with unfettered credit markets, agents’ perceptions of their future selves
will critically matter for asset demands at various ages. A naive agent understands her own
present bias but fails to recognize the same in her future self. Not sowith the sophisticated. Next,
8These are no different than analogous restrictions on portfolio (bond) holdings needed to rule out Ponzi schemes.
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we take up the decision problem of a fully naive ( = 0) young agent. We believe it is instruc-
tive to study this case in isolation before proceeding to study the case of partially sophisticated
(naive) agents,  2 (0; 1) :
3.1 Naive agent’s problem
A fully naive young agent ( = 0) expects her future selves to blindly follow the plans she lays
out for them. She chooses the optimal lifecycle plan by maximizing (1) subject to (6)-(8). The
first order conditions are
u0
 
!y   ay

= |{z}Ru0  !m   am + ayR ;(9)
u0
 
!m   am + ayR

= |{z}Ru0 (!o + amR) ;(10)
where
 
ay; am

are the interior optimal asset demands from the point of view of the naive young.
Notice, the young uses a discount factor  herself but believes her middle self will use , when
in fact, the latter will use . The zero private-saving corner during youth and middle-age are
defined by
u0(!y) > Ru0(!m   am) for ay = 0;(11)
u0
 
!m + a

yR

> Ru0 (!o) for am = 0;(12)
respectively. The young borrows if ay < 0, and saves if ay > 0. Note am is what the naive young
wants her middle-aged self to choose, not realizing the latter will not comply due to the time-
inconsistent preference. For (4), the optimal asset demand for the naive young is
(13) ay =
!y
h
R+ (R)
1

i
(R)
1
   !mR  !oh
R+ (R)
1

i
(R)
1
 +R2
;
and the same she plans for her middle-aged self is
(14) am =
(R)
1
 (R!y + !m)  !o
1
(R)
1
 +R
1
;
where 
1   1 +
h
R+R2 (R) 
1

i
=
h
R+ (R)
1

i
> 0:
It is easy to show
@ay
@
> 0:
Notice  serves a dual purpose here – see Salanie and Treich (2009). Larger  means the young
values future consumptionmore, hence savesmore, the standard story. But higher  alsomeans
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the present bias effect is weaker.
We next consider the naive agent’s problem at middle age. She has carried youthful debt,
ayR, pre-determined, intomiddle age, but her preference overmiddle and old age consumption
is (2), no longer (1): she takes ay as given and maximizes (2) subject to (7) and (8). Then the
middle-aged agent’s actual optimal asset demand, am (ay; ), a function of youthful debt, ay,
and degree of middle self’s present bias, ; solves
u0 (!m   am + ayR)  Ru0 (!o + amR) ;
which, for (4), is
(15) am (ay; ) =
(!m + ayR) (R)
1
   !o
R+ (R)
1

:
Denote by aN;m the actualmiddle-age asset demand of the naive (N)where aN;m  am
 
ay; 

and
it is obvious
aN;m  am:
The actual middle-age consumption (asset demand) of the naive agent is larger (smaller) than
what the young agent plans for her future selves. Using (13), we have
aN;m =
(R)
1
 (R!y + !m)  !o
2
(R)
1
 +R
2
;
where 
2  1 +
h
R+R2 (R) 
1

i
=
h
R+ (R)
1

i
> 0:
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Figure 1:  = 0; ay (blue), am (orange), a
N;
m (green)
against 
To summarize, the naive agent when young lays out the lifecycle plan
 
ay; am

, but due to the
subsequent preference change, the actual choice of the agent turns out to be

ay; a
N;
m

, which
implies the agent eventually overconsumes in middle age. This is illustrated in Figure 1 above.9
Notice, the figure is drawn for  = 0 (fully naive, no sophistication effect). In addition, as  ! 1;
the present-bias effect vanishes and the orange and green lines merge: the point where they
merge is the optimal choice of the exponential discounter.
Without loss of generality, in all that follows, we assume for all s,
(16) !y <
!mR+ !oh
R+ (R)
1

i
(R)
1

;
which ensures the young always borrow, the realistic case from a lifecycle perspective since the
young are natural borrowers.10
3.2 (Partially) sophisticated agent’s problem
Next, we consider a partially sophisticated (equivalently, partial naive) agent – when young, she
is “somewhat” aware that her future, middle-age self will wish to deviate from the plans she lays
out for them. Therefore, when choosing her youthful asset demand, aS;y , she incorporates her
perception of the anticipated behavior deviation of her future self by using the discount factor,
E : (We use the superscript, S; to denote allocations chosen by a sophisticated agent.) Tak-
ing aS;y as predetermined, the middle-aged agent actually chooses aS;m using the right discount
9In this and all subsequent figures, we setR = 1:5; !y = 2; !m = 5; !o = 1;  = 2 and  = 0:8:
10Coeurdacier et al. (2015) present compelling evidence that, around the world, consumers tend to be net borrow-
ers before reaching middle age.
10
factor, . Notice, we are about to describe a scenario in which both the present bias and the
sophistication effect arise.
3.2.1 Optimal asset demands
Wegoon to derive perception-perfect equilibria –O’Donoghue andRabin (2001) – of the Stackel-
berg game between a partially sophisticated agent and her future selves. The idea is to use back-
ward induction: figure out the young self’s asset demand under her perception of her middle-
aged self’s reaction to her choices. To that end, taking the youthful asset demand, ay, as paramet-
ric, we derive the optimal (from the young’s view point) middle-age asset demand, am
 
ay; 
E

by maximizing
(17) U(cm; co) = u (cm) + E|{z} u (co)
subject to (7) and (8). We have
(18) am
 
ay; 
E

=
(!m + ayR)
 
ER
 1
   !o
R+
 
ER
 1

:
am
 
ay; 
E

is equivalent to the expression for am (ay; ) (see eq. (15)) by substituting E for .
Notice am
 
ay; 
E

is what the young, partially-sophisticated self expects her futuremiddle-aged
self to save givenher ownbelief, E ; this is her perception of the reaction (function) of hermiddle
self to the ay she chooses.
Recall E  [ + (1  )] : Thismeans, ceteris paribus, E rises with  and falls with : Also,
notice E is the weight a young self believes her middle self will place on the latter’s future util-
ity. It is also the young agent’s perception of the effective present bias of hermiddle-aged self. Put
together, these statements imply that lower the time consistency (i.e., higher the ); the higher
is E and lower is the perceived future self’s present bias; but higher the level of sophistication,
the lower is E and higher is the perceived middle self’s present bias.
By substituting am
 
ay; 
E

into the youthful preference, (1), we have
(19)
Vy
 
ay; 
E

= u (cy)+ [u (cm) + u (co)] =
(!y   ay)1 
1   +
 
E
| {z } [(!m + ayR)R+ !o]
1 
1   ;
where

 
E
  1 +   ER 1 
R+
 
ER
 1

1  :
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Note,
 
E

= 1+  for  = 1 (log utility). Also note, 
 
E

is the combined weight on future
utility. All else same, if that weight increases, the effective present bias of the young is reduced.
We collect some properties of 
 
E

and the weight, 
 
E

; in the lemma below.
Lemma 1 a.
(20) 0
 
E

=

1  

  
1=E   1 (R) 1  E 1 
R+
 
ER
 1

2 
| {z }
0
8><>:
< 0;  > 1
= 0;  = 1
> 0;  < 1
;
b.
(21) 
 
E

+ 0
 
E

> 0;
and by (21),
c.
(22)
@
 

 
E

@
= 


 
E

+ 0
 
E

> 0;
(23)
@
 

 
E

@
= 

0
 
E

(   1)
8><>:
> 0;  > 1
= 0;  = 1
< 0;  < 1
:
What does this all mean? Recall E  [ + (1  )] : This means, ceteris paribus, E rises
with  and falls with : In words, given a sophistication level, the less the time-inconsistency
(higher the ), higher the E ; from (22), it implies a higher 
 
E

– a higher weight on future
utility – and lower the effective present bias.
Now, hold time inconsistency () fixed. Then, it follows from (23) that an increase in sophis-
tication () raises 
 
E

when  > 1 which means a higher weight on old-age utility, lower
the effective present bias (and hence, lower the tendency to overconsume in the current). But
when  < 1; the opposite happens: the effective present bias is higher which means a higher
tendency to overconsume in the current. This offers some intuition for why  is so crucial in
what follows. For log utility, neither  nor  has any effect on the weight to future utility: neither
present bias nor sophistication matters for allocation choices in this case.
As the Stackelberg leader of the multi-selves game, the young will choose ay to maximize
Vy
 
ay; 
E

; the lifetime utility from her perspective. Her perspective can be more or less flawed
depending on E , or indirectly, using (5), on : Vy
 
ay; 
E

denotes the flawed indirect utility
of the young using the middle-age asset holding am
 
ay; 
E

(one that incorrectly uses E to
discount the payoffs between middle and old age). When  = 1; the agent is fully sophisticated,
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we have E = . Then Vy (ay; ) is the correct indirect utility taking the correct middle-age asset
holding am (ay; ) into account, (the one that uses  as discount factor). That is, Vy (ay; ) is
equivalent to substituting am (ay; ) – see eq. (15) – into the preference at youth (1) and therefore
measures the actual lifetime welfare of the agent choosing ay at youth.
The reaction function of the sophisticated young, aS;y ; is solved by @Vy

aS;y ; E

=@ay = 0:
(24) aS;y


 aS;y =
!y

R2
 
E
 1
   !mR  !o
R2
 
E
 1
 +R2
:
It can be verified that the fully naive’s choice aS;y

=0
= ay (cf. (13)). Also, a
S;
y

=1
is the fully
sophisticated agent’s optimal choice. For convenience of notation, we let aF;y  aS;y

=1
in all of
the following. (We use the superscript, F , to denote allocations chosen by a fully sophisticated
agent.)
Notice, aS;y ; in general, involves , ; and : The effect of  is, in some sense, of first-order
importance, since for  = 1;
 
E

= 1+  and aS;y becomes independent of : for log utility, as
noticed earlier, sophistication or lack thereof has no impact on asset demands. In fact, it is easy
to check that for log utility, ay = a
S;
y (the naive and the sophisticated agent choices are identical,
irrespective of (; )). The curvature of u captures the ease or hesitation with which an agent is
willing to substitute current for future consumption. The naive undertakes such substitution
on her own terms and blissfully ignores the effect of her decisions on her future selves; not so
with the sophisticated. The latter saves an extra $1 on the margin to endow the middle-aged $1
extra wealth. The middle-aged can now borrow more to satisfy her present biased consump-
tion, an income effect. But doing so raises the relative marginal utility of old-age consumption
(compared to themarginal utility of middle-age consumption), causing him to save some of this
extra wealth to help finance old-age consumption, a substitution effect. For log utility, these two
effects cancel out: on net, sophistication, under log utility, brings no advantages whatsoever.
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What about the middle-aged self? Given aS;y , the optimal asset holding for the middle aged
who correctly discounts future old-age utility by , is aS;m = am

aS;y ; 

; and hence, the actual
lifetime welfare of the agent is Vy

aS;y ; 

. That is, aS;m is derived by using the expression for
am (ay; ) (see eq. (15)), substituting a
S;
y for ay: The following figure sets  = 0:4 (i.e., holds the
present bias effect constant) and studies the sophistication effect. The gap between actual and
“imagined” saving is the highest for the fully naive and is reduced with increased sophistication.
Figure 2
3.2.2 Impact of time inconsistency and sophistication on asset demands
Next, we study how the sophisticated young strategically chooses her asset holding to combat
future undesired deviations. We wish to understand how the sophistication level, ; and time
inconsistency, , play into her decisions. Recall, the sophisticated young discounts payoffs be-
tween young andmiddle age by , and the payoffs between middle and old age by E.
Lemma 2 a. For a given  2 [0; 1],
(25)
@aS;y
@
=
daS;y
d
 

 
E
   E+ 0  E > 0;
and
b. For a given ; daS;y =d > 0, dE=d =   (1  )  < 0 holds, implying
(26)
@aS;y
@
=   (1  )  da
S;
y
d
0
 
E

T 0; for  T 1:
The proof is a straightforward application of Lemma 1. Notice, (25) implies the optimal as-
set holding of the young decreases in the level of time inconsistency because she always un-
dervalues future payoffs during youth and middle age causing her to reduce her asset holding
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when young. (26) means, when  > 1; the sophisticated young will save more than her fully
naive counterpart. Also, the optimal youthful asset holding of the partially sophisticated agent
is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in her sophistication level, i.e.,
Proposition 1
ay  aS;y

=0
< aS;y

2(0;1) < a
S;
y

=1
 aF;y ;  > 1
ay  aS;y

=0
> aS;y

2(0;1) > a
S;
y

=1
 aF;y ;  < 1:
From the perspective of the sophisticated young, her middle-aged self consumes too much
(saves too little, hence has too little old-age consumption). As such, anymechanism that delivers
less consumption in middle age and more in old age is welcome from her perspective. The
problem is, she has only one instrument at her disposal: her own asset holding. If she raises it
(possibly, reduces her borrowing), middle-aged wealth rises; some of this is used by the middle-
aged to raise consumption but the remainder is passed on as higher wealth to the old. The
latter effect is desirable but not the former. In short, the simultaneous reduction in middle-
age consumption and increase in old-age consumption, while desirable from the young self’s
perspective, is not possible using the one tool she has, her youthful asset holding. (She needs
some help but the unfettered nature of the market precludes it.) When  > 1, agents would
substitute out ofmiddle into old-age consumption: in this case, increasing old-age consumption
ismore salient to her, and therefore, as  increases – themore sophisticated the agent – themore
she would increase her youthful asset holding to increase future old-age consumption. Vice
versa for the case  < 1.
Figure 3 : aS;y


against ;  > 1
From the standpoint of the young, the committed (or the fully naive) solution
 
ay; am

would
be first best. However, because of time inconsistency, this is unachievable sans further inter-
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vention even if the agent is fully sophisticated.11 It is evident that, ex post, the young always
prefer solutions that use future discount rates in a sophisticated manner. Henceforth, we refer
to the choices of a fully sophisticated agent as second-best. The welfare ranking of different as-
set choices is given in the proposition below. It needs to be noted that the welfare of the young
agent monotonically increases in her sophistication level.
Proposition 2
 
ay; a

m
   aS;y ; aS;m =1   aF;y ; aF;m    aS;y ; aS;m 2(0;1)   aS;y ; aS;m =0   ay; aN;m 
As discussed, when  > 1, partially sophisticated agents borrow too much compared to
their fully sophisticated counterparts. That opens up the possibility that imperfections in the
credit market, those that prevent borrowing (and hence, overborrowing!) may indeed help some
agents. We take this up in the next section.
4 An economywith borrowing constraints
We proceed to investigate an economy in which the CFPB regulates borrowing based on an
ability-to-repay rule. Thismeans, the CFPB dictates lenders to lend only to the extent a borrower
can repay.12 Tomake the problem interesting, inspired byKehoe and Levine (1993) andAzariadis
and Lambertini (2003), here onwe posit that agents are strategic about repaying their loans: they
weigh the costs and benefits from default. The penalty for (or opportunity cost of) default is to-
tal exclusion from credit markets thereafter and seizure of all tangible assets but not her private,
inalienable endowments. (Think of this as consumer bankruptcy.) Such a severe penalty thwarts
consumption smoothing and, is hence, a deterrent against default for some. The CPFB (and the
lenders) are aware of this default calculus and screen (impose limits on) the amounts a person
can borrow. This limit prevents “overborrowing” (from the lender’s perspective) and eliminates
default. What makes the subsequent analysis extra interesting and challenging is that a) agents
are (partially) naive and could benefit from external help, and b) their naivete may exacerbate
any existing desire to “overborrow” and subsequently default. The CFPB’s ability-to-repay rule
may be able to help with both.13
11Del Rey and Lopez-Garcia (2019) reach a very similar conclusion.
12Zhang (1997) assumes “that there exists an outside agency that knows the investor’s problem. The agency plays
no role other than in setting up and enforcing the borrowing limits. Should an investor default on his debt, the agency
would exclude him from intertemporal asset trading forever.” The CFPB is that agency.
13Sometimes, researchers use the term “full commitment economy” to describe what we have called the “complete
markets economy”. What theymean is that in the completemarkets economy, all agents can fully commit to repaying
their loans. By the same token, the incomplete commitment economy is what we call the “borrowing-constrained
economy” because borrowers can strategically default, meaning there is no ex ante commitment to repay loans taken
on by past selves. We avoid the term “commitment” in this context because we save it to differentiate between the
naive and the sophisticated: the former incorrectly believe they can commit to their future plans while the latter
realize they have no commitment power.
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Since the CFPB is a governmental entity, we assume it is benevolent and uses the welfare of
the sophisticated young as its yardstick for policy interference. This is consistent with the idea
that naivete is a behavioral mistake and may lead to ‘overborrowing’ and it is the government’s
job to help such people. The CFPB is paternalistic because it uses the utility of the fully sophis-
ticated young to tell others how to behave or prevent people frommaking behavioral mistakes.
A word about default. Under perfect information, lenders set the borrowing limit at an
amount that balances the costs and benefits of default. It is in the borrower’s self interest to
repay any loan that is less than this borrowing limit; as such, default never occurs in equilib-
rium. For this reason, as we will see, agents face the same interest rate independently of their
income and debt levels.14
4.1 Borrowing limits
Lenders are instructed by the CFPB to apply the ability-to-repay rule. Recall, the CFPB uses
agents’ actual discount factor between middle and old age, .15 (Below, we show that were the
CFPB to use the discount factor, E; the same as used by borrowers, all borrowerswill default on
their youthful debt upon reaching middle age.) Suppose the young agent cannot borrow more
than ( ay; am) in youth andmiddle age,
ay  ay;(27)
am  am:(28)
Clearly (ay; am) should satisfy the following individual rationality constraints (IRC):
u (cm) + u (co)  u (!m) + u (!o) ; IRC (1)
u (co)  u (!o) : IRC (2)
These two IRCs amounts to self-enforcement of loan contracts: creditors should always offer
a loan of a size sufficient to ensure that borrowers will always prefer repayment to default at
middle age. IRC(2) means middle-aged agents are not allowed to borrow. This is because credit
market participation at that age has no value for them in old age leaving themwith no reason to
repay their debts. It is evident that IRC(2) is equivalent to
(29) am  0;
which solves the borrowing limit for middle-aged agents, i.e., am = 0.
14In the data, lenders use both the interest rate and the credit constraints to separate borrowers, since agents may
have different (non-zero) default probabilities. Abraham and Carceles-Poveda (2010) argue that, nevertheless, a
model with no default is in line with U.S. data in terms of its predictions regarding how the borrowing limits and
(labor) income are related.
15The assumption is also reasonable if one assumes that a practice of repeat lending to many will eventually alert
lenders to the true preferences of their clients.
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The borrowing limit for the young is more complicated. Young borrowers carry debts ayR
and an utility function (2) into middle age. If the middle-aged agent repays the debts of her
youth, she can continue to trade in the credit market and has the following value function:
(30)
Vm (ay)  maxfamg fu (!m + ayR  am) + u (!o + amR)g
s.t. am  0;
where, at an optimum, am = am (ay; ). Otherwise, she is excluded from the credit market and
in autarky, that is, (cm; co) = (!m; !o). As previously discussed, the CFPB imposes a borrowing
limit that renders borrowers indifferent between autarky and market participation in middle
age. Hence, by defining
(31) H (ay)  Vm (ay)  u (!m)  u (!o) ;
the borrowing limit for the young is determined by
(32) H (ay) = 0:
Given the definition of ay, it is evident that themiddle-aged agent will default on her youthful
debt if and only if she borrows more than ay in her youth. It is easy to show that the borrowing
limit, ay, for the young monotonically increases in ,
@ ( ay)
@
=
@H=@
@H=@ay
=
u (!o + amR)  u (!o)
Ru0 (!m + ayR  am)  0:
Large  means the borrower has a stronger incentive to save when middle aged, and therefore,
a stronger incentive to avoid autarky allowing creditors to lend more. Also notice, since E > 
and @ ( ay) =@ > 0; creditors (or the CFPB), were they to lend according to the incorrect naive
beliefs E ; would “overlend” leading to rampant default on all youthful debt. For the CES utility
function,
(33)  ay = !m
R
+
!o
R2
 
 
!1 m + !1 o
 1
1  R
2 1
1 h
R+ (R)
1

i 
1 
;
which is independent of the agent’s sophistication level, , since the loan decision is made with
 = 1 (E = ; full sophistication) in mind. Henceforth, ( ay; am) are termed the endogenous
borrowing constraints (EBC).
4.2 Borrowing-constrained asset demands
Denote aB;m the solution to (30), the optimal asset demand for amiddle-aged agent who has paid
off her past debt. (We use superscript B to denote borrowing-constrained.) By (29), it is evident
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that aB;m  0; no borrowing when middle aged. As standard in the literature, (32) shows that
the young are not allowed to borrow, i.e., ay = 0, if and only if a
B;
m = 0 (the middle-aged would
have liked to borrow but are borrowing constrained by (29). Hence, we define a threshold value
of ; call it L, such that for all   L, the asset demands of young and middle-aged agents are
simultaneously binding and equal to zero. More formally,
u0 (!m)  Ru0 (!o) =)   u
0 (!m)
Ru0 (!o)
 L:
This means the young can borrow (or lenders are allowed by the CFPB to lend to the young)
only when every agent has   L. 16By way of contrast, recall with complete credit markets,
young agents with  2 (0; 1] could borrow. When   L, the optimal asset demand of amiddle-
aged agent with no prior borrowing is positive, i.e., aB;m > 0. In this case, defaulting is costly
for middle-aged agents, and, as noted by (32), creditors can always choose a strictly positive
borrowing limit which ensures the agent is indifferent between default and repayment.
Recall under complete markets, we have @aS;y =@  0 (25) while from (33), the borrowing
limit for the young, ay, is zero when  2 (0; L] and monotonically decreases in  when  2
[L; 1]. Hence, the two curves a
S;
y () and ay () must intersect (see Figure 4 for an example).
Suppose they intersect at H . Then, there are three possible outcomes. 1)  2 (0; L]: for  in
this range, everyone is borrowing constrained both in youth and in middle age. In this case,
ay = 0 and a
B;
y = a
B;
m = 0, and the economy is in financial autarky with no activity in the
credit market. 2)  2 [L; H ]: each agent is borrowing constrained but only when young.17
In this case, borrowing constraints are slack for middle-aged agents, with aB;y = ay < 0 and
aB;m  am (ay; ) > 0. 3)   H : both borrowing constraints are slack, yielding complete
market solutions,

aS;y ; aS;m

. If H > 1, we do not have the last case.
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16When   L, u0 (!m) =u0 (!o)  R holds, a middle-aged agent has no incentive to save even if she incurred
no debt in her youth. In that case, an indebted middle-aged agent would always choose to default. Knowing this,
creditors will not lend to the young, implying ay = 0.
17H cannot be smaller than L. Otherwise the young will be unconstrained even when the borrowing limit in
youth is zero. This means under complete markets, the young want to save and not borrow for all  2 [H ; 1], which
cannot be true under the assumption of (16).
18Notice that H could be larger or smaller than 1. H  1 if and only if aS;y

=1
 ayj=1, which after some
tedious algebra is equivalent to !y  !y where
!y =
" 
!1 m + !
1 
o

R
R+ (R)
1

# 1
1 
R (R)
1
 + (R)
2
 +R2
R2 (R)
1

  !mR+ !o
R2
:
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Figure 4: Asset demand of the young agent
We finally can define optimal asset demands,

aB;y ; aB;m

, in a way that respect the IRCs.
Note that if ay < a
S;
y , the borrowing constraint for a young agent is slack, and her optimal asset
demand is equal to the CM solution. Young-age optimal asset demand is, thus, defined by
(34) aB;y = max

ay; a
S;
y
	
:
Similarly, the optimal asset demand in middle age is
(35) aB;m = max

0; am
 
aB;y ; 
	
:
5 Welfare Impact of Endogenous Borrowing Constraints
Since (1) is our welfare yardstick, the naive agents’ optimal choices in youth and under complete
markets,
 
ay; am

– see Section 3.1 – are thefirst-best solutions. Of course, as we have seen, naive
or partially sophisticated agents do not follow previously made plans and would overconsume
during middle age. This also means, without intervention from the government, agents on their
own cannot achieve the first-best solutions in the complete market. What can they achieve? In
other words, given the middle aged agent actually chooses am (ay; ) and not am, what is the
maximum value of (1)? This is exactly the question fully sophisticated agents face. This means
Vy

aF;y ; 

is the highest lifetime welfare an agent can actually achieve in the complete market.
That is, Vy

aF;y ; 

> Vy (ay; ) for all ay 6= aF;y . We refer to the optimal choices of the fully
sophisticated agent,

aF;y ; aF;m

, as the second-best solution.
Below, we explore whether EBC can improve the resource allocations and welfare of partially
sophisticated agents by comparing their optimal asset demands in the complete market to the
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second best solutions. This seems counterintuitive since conventional wisdom suggests that
any constraints on credit availability would impede consumption smoothing and thereby hurt
agents. Not so, though, when agents are time inconsistent and prone to present bias. Can EBC
help? To foreshadow, the answer is yes, and it depends on both  and . Recall, from Section
2.3, the former is associated with the present-bias effect, and the latter with the sophistication
effect.
5.1 Present-bias effect
We refer to results concerning (given agents’ sophistication level  2 [0; 1)) how the degree of
present-bias  affect the welfare impacts of EBC as the present-bias effect. Recall, all agents
are completely borrowing constrained with autarkic consumption when  2 [0; L], partially
borrowing constrained when  2 [L; H ] and completely unconstrained when  2 [H ; 1].
This means, if agents are mildly time inconsistent,  2 [H ; 1], they would each freely choose
the complete market allocations, and therefore EBC can have no influence on their decisions
and welfare.19 What about economies in which agents are significantly time-inconsistent,  2
[0; H ]? Our flagship proposition reports on this issue. Recall, if   1, the naive and partially
sophisticated agents borrow “too little” during youth in the completemarket and EBC cannot be
welfare improving for them.
Proposition 3 Suppose  > 1 so that naive and partially sophisticated agents borrow “toomuch”.
Given any sophistication level  2 [0; 1), there exists a threshold degree of present bias, b 2
(L; H), such that
1) if H  1, EBC reduce their lifetime welfare for  2

0; bi, increase it when  2 hb; Hi and
have no impact on agents’ lifetime welfare when  2 [H ; 1];
2) if H  1 and b  1, EBC reduce lifetime welfare when  2 0; bi and increase it for  2 hb; 1i;
and
3) if 1  b  H , EBC always reduce lifetime welfare.
The upshot is that for economies with “intermediate” levels of time inconsistency, i.e.,  2hb;min (H ; 1)i, EBC can help agents and even deliver higher welfare than under completemar-
kets. EBC prevent young agents from borrowing too much, but if they are too tight, they may
hurt the young by restricting their ability to smooth consumption across periods. It follows that
EBC have two opposing effects on young agents’ welfare. Since the borrowing limit imposed on
the young, ay () ; ismonotonically increasing in , only when  is close to H , i.e.,  2
hb; Hi,
so that EBC are not too tight, the positive effect of EBC can dominate, improving welfare. Not
only that. As shown in the proof for Proposition 3, EBC could further help everyone achieve the
19Recall in the complete market, partially sophisticated agents may overborrow in youth if only if  > 1. Therefore,
a necessary condition for EBC to be of some help is  > 1.
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second best,

aF;y ; aF;m

; in economies where  2
b; H and  solves ay ()  aF;y (). Notice,
since b 2 (L; H), the welfare of everyone in the highest present bias economies,  2 (0; L],
who are also completely borrowing constrained, cannot be improved via EBC.
We move on to ask, given , how does the welfare gain generated by EBC,Vy = Vy (ay; ) 
Vy

aS;y ; 

, change with . Here, we focus attention on case (1) of Proposition 3 where H  1.
Results for other scenarios are easily extended. From Proposition 3 and Figure 4, it is evident
that the welfare gain of EBC is negative for

0; bi, i.e., Vy < 0, but monotonically increases in
 as the absolute difference between EBC solution and CM solution, ay   aS;y , monotonically
decreases in . Moreover, as shown in Proposition 3, the welfare gain of EBC is positive forhb; Hi and equals to zero for [H ; 1]. These two statements, together with the continuity of
Vy, imply an inverted U-shaped relationship between the welfare gain of EBC,Vy; and . The
following lemma shows how agents’ sophistication level  affect the present-bias effect of EBC.
Lemma 3 If > 1, b (H)monotonically increases (decreases) in, i.e., @b=@ > 0 and @H=@ <
0:
Proposition 3 shows that EBC can improve the welfare of naive and partially sophisticated
agents in economieswith  2
hb;min (H ; 1)i. Lemma3, however, shows that the range hb;min (H ; 1)i
shrinks with sophistication implying EBC lose potency with increased sophistication. In the ex-
treme, as agents become fully sophisticated,
hb;min (H ; 1)i shrinks to a singleton and EBC can
no longer improve welfare for agents in any  economy.
5.2 Sophistication effect
We now proceed to explore how welfare impacts of EBC change in  for fixed . Define bF by
ay
bF = aF;y bF  aS;y bF
=1
. Similarly define bN by ay bN = ay bN  aS;y bN
=0
.
As shown in Figure 4, bF and bN are the twoboundaries of intersections between the curve ay ()
and the set of curves aS;y ()

2[0;1]
, and bF < H j2(0;1) < bN . Notice, bF and bN are indepen-
dent of. bN could be larger or smaller than 1. For simplicity, we assume bN < 1 in the following
proposition. The results for bN > 1 can be easily extended as in Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 Suppose  > 1.
(1) Consider an economy with  < bF where the agents are highly present biased, every naive
and sophisticated agents are borrowing constrained, and therefore have to make same decisions
ay. Then, there exists a threshold degree of sophistication, b1 2 [0; 1), such that EBC improve
the welfare of the less sophisticated agents endowed with  2 [0; b1], and reduce the welfare of
more sophisticated agents endowed with  2 [b1; 1]. Moreover the welfare gain generated by EBC,
Vy = Vy (ay; )  Vy

aS;y ; 

, monotonically decreases in  for  2 [0; 1].
(2) If bF   < bN so that agents are intermediately present biased, there exists a threshold
degree of sophistication, b2 2 (0; 1), such that all agents endowed with  2 [0; b2] are borrowing
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constrained and have to make the same decisions ay, and all agents endowed with  2 [b2; 1]
are unconstrained. EBC improve the welfare of the former, less sophisticated agents and have
no impacts on the welfare of the latter, more sophisticated agents. Moreover, the welfare gain
generated by EBCVy monotonically decreases in  for  2 [0; b2].
(3) If bN    1 so that agents are mildly present biased, every agent is unconstrained and
EBC have no impact on their welfare.
The proposition mainly shows that given , EBC would hurt (or have no impact on) more
sophisticated agents and help the less sophisticated ones. Since the sophistication level reflects
howmuch agents are aware of self-control problems they may face in the future, this awareness
help agents be strategic in choosing today’s behavior. Hence, given , the welfare of the agent
monotonically increases in . As aforediscussed, imposing borrowing limits have two opposing
effects on agents. Since themore sophisticated agents are less inclined to borrow toomuch, they
are more likely to be hurt by EBC. Vice versa for less sophisticated agents. Since given ;welfare
gain under EBC Vy monotonically decreases in , the sophistication effect of EBC is always
negative.
6 Optimal government Policies
We have shown two things. First, in the CM economy, naive or partially sophisticated agents
cannot achieve either the first or the second best allocations, and b) in the EBC world, only
when all agents are in a certain range for  can they achieve at most the second best. Without
further intervention, the first best solutions,
 
ay; am

, are entirely unachievable by the market,
with or without the CFPB. Then a natural question arises, can a (time consistent) public policy
restore
 
ay; am

?20 The answer is yes, but for that, the public policy has to work in tandem with
the EBC (or the CPFB).
To see this, consider a government implementing a lump-sum, tax-transfer scheme where
(y; m;  o), respectively, denotes the lump-sum (tax) transfer to the young, themiddle aged and
the old. In this case, the budget constraints for the agents become
cy + ay = !y + y;
cm + am = !m + ayR+ m;
co = !o + amR+  o:
As will be shown below, such a policy can deliver the first best only when the credit market is
operated under EBC.
20See also Guo and Caliendo (2014) for a setting where the government’s policy itself is time inconsistent.
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Recall, the first best solutions
 
ay; am

satisfy
cy +
cm
R
+
co
R2
= !y +
!m
R
+
!o
R2
:
As such, any such intergenerational policy must leave the present value of lifetime income, Y 
!y + !m=R+ !o=R
2, unchanged, meaning
(36) y +
m
R
+
 o
R2
= 0
must hold.
First, consider how such a fiscal policy affects activities in the CM world. Given assump-
tion (16), i.e., the young borrow and the middle aged save, an optimal fiscal policy requires the
government to tax the middle aged and transfer the revenue to the young and old. The pol-
icy is consistent with what Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Wang (2014) propose. They show,
when time consistent agents borrow to invest in education when young and the credit markets
are imperfect (missing), the only way to replicate the completemarket solutions is by “establish-
ing publicly balanced education and pay-as-you-go pensions simultaneously, and by linking the
two flows of payment via themarket interest rate”. In their setups, the joint institutional arrange-
ments offer a perfect replacement for the missing credit market, and therefore, can replicate the
complete market allocations.
However, when agents are time inconsistent, and are in theCMworld, the above policy (satis-
fying (36) and leaving Y unchanged) cannot affect allocations: in particular, the optimal youth-
ful asset demand of naive and partially sophisticated agents, aS;y ; would remain unchanged.
The same argument also applies to middle aged agents. Intuitively, with complete markets, any
policy-induced rearrangement of after-tax endowments with no change in Y can be entirely
undone by appropriate borrowing and saving alterations by the agent. In particular, nothing
prevents the middle-aged from undoing the plans laid out by the young (Andersen and Bhat-
tacharya, 2019). The policy under complete markets is impotent.
Finally, we explore whether the policy can replicate the first-best solutions in an EBC econ-
omy. For any  2 [0; 1], consider the following policy scheme
(37) y =  ay; m = ayR  am; and  o = amR,
which satisfies (36). Notice, under this specific policy scheme, the following equation always
holds,
u0 (!m + m)
u0 (!o +  o)
= R;
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which is equivalent to (10). Moreover, since agents are time inconsistent,  < 1, we always have
u0 (!m + m)
u0 (!o +  o)
> R;
which implies that given the policy scheme (37), a middle-aged agent has no incentive to save
even if she incurred no debt in her youth. If that is the case, then, for sure, an indebted middle-
aged agent would choose to default on her youthful loan. Anticipating this, creditors will simply
not lend to the young, implying ay = 0. Evidently, under this specific arrangement of intergen-
erational transfers, both the young and the middle-aged are completely borrowing constrained,
leaving the agent in autarky. As the consequence, the consumption of the agents reads
cy = !y + y = !y   ay
cm = !m + m = !m + a

yR  am
co = !o +  o = !o + a

mR;
which exactly replicates the first best solutions,
 
cy; cm; co

! The policy scheme (37), in effect, re-
sets the endowment in each period to equal the first best consumption levels. If the agents can-
not borrow or save their entire life, consuming their endowment is optimal. The policy scheme
(37) with help from the CFPB ensures, in particular, that middle-aged agents cannot borrow.
The CFPB offers a publicly provided commitment mechanism that effectively forces the agents
to stay put on the first best path.21
7 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the role of markets and institutions in helping time-inconsistent agents deal
with their self control problems. Using a textbook, exogenous endowment lifecycle model, it
compares outcomes in a complete, unfettered credit market with those in an environment with
borrowing constraints. These borrowing constraints are endogenously set in such a way that no
borrower can borrowmore thanwhat she has incentive to pay back. The borrowing limit ensures
that a borrower’s expected discounted lifetime utility from participating in the asset market is at
least as high as that of autarky, in which the borrower only consumes her exogenous endowment
income every time period. These two market settings roughly correspond to a stylized world
before and after the enforcement of the CFPB. The main take away from our paper is that, naive
21Recall when  > 1, we have ay < a
S;
y

2(0;1]. In this case, given the policy scheme (37), sophisticated agents,
that are aware their future self may deviate would like to optimally choose cS;y = !y   aS;y by saving during youth.
Notice the decision of cS;y is made upon on the expectation of 
E. Since EBC cannot prevent the young from saving,
does that mean the policy fails to replicate the first best solutions? The answer is, no. Since all information of the
credit market is public, the sophisticated agents in an EBC economy also know they will not be allowed to borrow
during the middle age. Knowing that to be the case, the sophisticated agents with  > 1 and  2 (0; 1] understand
that if they consume cy during the young age, the future selves will certainly follow the consumption plan (c

m; c

o)
even if they want to change the plan. Since
 
cy; c

m; c

o

is the first best consumption plan from the view at youth,
those young sophisticated agents have no incentive to base their decision on E.
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agents, those who are somewhat clueless about their impending loss of self control, may benefit
from the borrowing restrictions that were put in place after the CFPB. In some cases, they would
be better off compared to a world in which credit flowed freely without constraints.22
It is useful to record a few limitations of the current study with an eye to future research
possibilities. First, we restrict attention to a setup where all agents are identical (have the same
(; ; )) and that these are known to all. Clearly, this is a vast simplification. Allowing for hetero-
geneity and unobservability in either or  or may allow formore interesting optimal contracts
that induce self selection and separation. Similarly, the current analysis is silent on the issue of
lenders designing contracts that exploit consumer naiveté and behavioral errors in general – see
Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2010).23
While the present paper is focused entirely on the role of endogenous borrowing constraints
and their impact on the lives of hyperbolic discounters, it is nevertheless interesting to ask if
regulation went at it from a different angle, mandating saving for such consumers instead of
restricting their access to credit. Andersen and Bhattacharya (2019) and Pardo (2019) offer a
fresh discussion of this issue in the context of retirement saving. Findley and Hunt (2019) study
the Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) program to help hyperbolic discounters be better prepared
for retirement. They find that any increased saving from participation in a SMarT program can
be completely offset by crowding out of other saving vehicles or evenmore borrowing. In such a
context, it may be worthwhile to study the joint regulation of borrowing and saving.
Finally, as the introduction argues, there is a sense in which the market in the EBC world
generates commitment publicly. This means individuals, grappling with their self-control prob-
lems, do not need to invest (or, more generally, invest as much) in private commitment assets,
such as annuities, on their own. But what if both private assets and publicly-generated com-
mitment were jointly present? Would the latter, in the spirit of Krueger and Perri (2011) crowd
out the former, and is that desirable? More bluntly, is the CFPB, in effect, killing off the private
commitment asset market? These, and many other questions, are deserving of future inquiry.
22These ideas are reminiscent of a parallel discussion on bankruptcy reform, started in White (2007) and contin-
uing, for example, in Nakajima (2017). This discussion makes the very useful distinction between a person whose
principal identity is that of a borrower versus another whose main identity is a saver. As White (2007) neatly argues,
“[...] hyperbolic discounters have dynamically inconsistent preferences; they prefer to borrow today and start saving
tomorrow – but tomorrow never comes. These sophisticated hyperbolic discounters prefer a very pro-debtor bank-
ruptcy system, since lenders ration credit more tightly and may not be willing to lend at all when the bankruptcy
system is very pro-debtor. Thus, whether hyperbolic discounters prefer a pro-debtor or pro-creditor bankruptcy sys-
tem depends on whether or not they recognize their tendency to borrow too much and favor a bankruptcy system
that helps them control their own behavior.”
23Senator ElizabethWarrenwrote inOren andWarren (2008): “Consumers, their families, their neighbors, and their
communities are paying a high price for systematic cognitive errors. Creditors have aligned their products to exploit
such errors, driving up costs for many consumers."
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof relies on the expression of0
 
E

and
 
E

+ 0
 
E

: The
expression of 0
 
E

, i.e., equation (20), can be easily derived from 0
 
E

. As for 
 
E

+
0
 
E

, we have

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E

+ 0
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E

=

1 + 
 
ER
 1 

 
R+
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ER
 1


+
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1 


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1=E   1  ER 1 =E
R+
 
ER
 1

2 
=
	+R+ 
 
ER
 2 
 + 
 
1=E   1  ER 1 =E
R+
 
ER
 1

2  > 0;
where 1=E   1 > 0 and by using E  ;
	 =
h
E + E +
 
E
2   i  ER 1 
E
2 > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove part 2 by examining the welfare impacts of EBC under differ-
ent regimes of .
(1)Welfare impacts oneconomieswith intermediate levels of time inconsistency 2 [L; H ]
Recall, in the EBCworld, the agent with intermediate level of time inconsistency  2 [L; H ]
is only borrowing constrained (unconstrained) in youth (middle age), and therefore has the ac-
tual lifetimewelfareVy (ay; ). Evidently, EBC could improve theirwelfare if and only ifVy (ay; ) 
Vy

aS;y ; 

. Since EBC is incapable of improving the welfare of the fully sophisticated agent,
which is the highest lifetime welfare an agent can actually achieve in the completemarket, we in
the proof let aS;y stand for aS;y

2[0;1)
.
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Figure 5: The welfare of agents
So, when does Vy (ay; )  Vy

aS;y ; 

obtain? As discussed, when the credit market is per-
fect, the second best solution aF;y solved by @Vy

aF;y ; 

=@ay;t = 0 yields higher welfare than
aS;y . Moreover, as shown in (26), when  > 1, the optimal youthful asset holding of the sophisti-
cated agent is monotonically increasing in . Hence when  > 1; aF;y > aS;y holds: the partially
sophisticated borrow too much. Since Vy (ay; ) is concave in ay and peaked at a
F;
y ; as shown in
the Figure 5, aS;y is located to the left of aF;y . Then there must exist a threshold value of youthful
asset, bay, under which Vy (bay; ) = V aS;y ;  and bay is located to the right of aF;y , i.e., bay > aF;y .
That is bay (bay 6= aS;y;t ) is defined by
(!y   bay)1 
1   +  ()
[(!m + bayR)R+ !o]1 
1  (38)
=

!y   aS;y
1 
1   +  ()
h
!m + a
S;
y R

R+ !o
i1 
1   :
For the naive or partially sophisticated agent with 2 [0; 1), her completemarket solution is aS;y ,
but evidently, as shown in the Figure 5, any choice of ay 2
h
aS;y ;bayiwould be welfare improving
for her. Hence in an EBC economy, if the borrowing limit for the young, ay, happens to be located
in
h
aS;y ;bayi, EBC will increase the welfare of the naive or partially sophisticated agents endowed
with  2 [L; H ].
We proceed to derive the conditions on  that guarantee ay 2
h
aS;y ;bayi. Firstly notice that
when  ! 0 or  = 1 so that the time inconsistency problem disappears, we have aF;y = aS;y
which in turn leads to bay = aF;y at the two moments. Since aF;y monotonically increases in
31
 and bay is always larger than aF;y , bay also increases in  during [0; 1]. Hence from the same
starting point  !y   !m=R   !o=R2, the optimal youthful asset demand evaluated at  = 0,
the three curves of bay, aF;y and aS;y all increase in , with bay (aS;y ) always laid above (below)
aF;y , and converge on exactly the same endpoint at  = 1. In contrast, starting from zero, the
borrowing limit for the young ay monotonically deceases in , and as afore-discussed, becomes
smaller than aS;y after H . Then as shown in Figure 6, there must exist an intersection between
the two curves,  ay () and  bay (), where  2 [0; 1]. Denote b the point where  ay () and
 bay () get intersected. b is solved by ay b = bay b. Since by definition bay is always smaller
than  aS;y , b is smaller than H but larger than L. Evidently when  2 hb; Hi, we have ay 2h
aS;y ;bayi. That is for all  2 hb; Hi, EBC help correct the over-borrowing behavior of the naive
and partially sophisticated young agents and therefore improves their welfare. Moreover, it is
evident fromFigure 6 that, if  happens to be equal to bF , the intersection point between the two
curves ay () and aF;y (), EBC canhelp all naive andpartially sophisticated agent achieve the
second best solutions,

aF;y ; aF;m

.
Figure 6: Youthful asset demands
(2) Welfare impact on economies with highly time inconsistent agents  2 (0; L]
In the EBCworld, when  2 (0; L], agents are borrowing constrained in both youth andmid-
dle age, and is in autarky in all of her life, with lifetimewelfare equal tou (!y)+ [u (!m) + u (!o)].
Consider a hypothetical case that when  2 (0; L] so that agents are completely borrowing
constrained when young, ay = 0, but are unconstrained and therefore capable of smoothing
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consumption during middle and old age, i.e., borrowing during middle age and repay the loan
during old age, which is impossible under the framework of EBC. For any  2 (0; L], the welfare
of agents in this hypothetical case is evidently higher than the actual welfare of the agents under
EBC. Moreover, since agents are free to participate in the credit market during middle age, the
welfare of agents in this hypothetical case is exactly equal to Vy (0; ), the CM welfare of agents
choosing zero asset at youth. We hence have u (!y) +  [u (!m) + u (!o)] < Vy (0; ).
In the CM world, the agent is free to borrow and save in all of her life and would opti-
mally choose aS;y at youth. Recall that bay is determined by Vy aS;y ;  = Vy (bay; ). Since
as shown in Figure 6 bay is always smaller than ay = 0 during (0; L], we have Vy aS;y ;  =
Vy (bay; ) > Vy (0; ), which can be obtained from Figure 5 and lead to Vy aS;y ;  > u (!y) +
 [u (!m) + u (!o)]. That is when  2 (0; L], the CM solutions are Pareto dominant over the
EBC solutions, meaning EBC cannot increase the welfare of agents. The results hold for all
 2 [0; 1].
Proof of Lemma 3. First we apply implicit function theorem to (38),
@bay
@
=

@aS;y =@

dVy

aS;y ; 

=day
dVy (bay; ) =day :
As shown in Figure 5, dVy

aS;y ; 

=day > 0 and dVy (bay; ) =day < 0. Following directly from
(26), @aS;y =@ > 0 when  > 1. We hence have @bay=@ < 0 when  > 1: That is as the agents
become more sophisticated ( gets larger), the curve of  bay in Figure 6 would move up. On the
other hand, the curves of aF;y and ay are independent of , which implies that the intersection
point between bay and ay, b, will become larger. Similarly since @aS;y =@ > 0when  > 1, the
curve of aS;y in Figure 6 would move down as  increases, which in turn decreases the value of
H .
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof relies on Figure 6 and Figure 5.
(1)  < bF . As shown in the Proof of Proposition 3, when  > 1, the curve of  aS;y in Figure
6 monotonically moves down as  increases. Hence if  > 1 and  < bF , following directly
from Figure 6, we have ay () > a
S;
y () for all 0s, which means all naive and sophisticated
agents are borrowing constrained. From (26), we recall that aS;y ()

2[0;1)
is located to the left
of aF;y in Figure 5 and monotonically increases to aF;y as  increases to one. Moreover since
the borrowing limit ay () is indepedent of , all borrowing constrained agents are forced to
hold same amount of assets at youth, ay (), which is located to the right of a
F;
y . Hence, givenb1 2 [0; 1] ; there must exist a threshold value of b1, defined by Vy (ay; ) = Vy aS;y ; 
=b1 ,
such that Vy (ay; )  Vy

aS;y ; 

2[0;b1] and Vy (ay; )  Vy

aS;y ; 

2[b1;1]. The relathioship
between welfare gain of EBC and  follows directly from Figure 5. Notice that b1 equals to zero if
Vy (ay; )  Vy

aS;y ; 

=0
.
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(2) bF <  < bN . Using Figure 6, we can show that when bF <  < bN , there must exists a
shreshold value of b2, defined by Vy (ay; ) = Vy aS;y ; 
=b2 , such that ay () > aS;y ()

2[0;b2]
and ay ()  aS;y ()

2[b2;1]. That is agents with sohpistication level  2 [0; b2] are borrowing
constrained and have to choose ay (), while agents with sohpistication level  2 [b2; 1] are
unconstrained and could optimally choose CM solutions. Moreover ay () now is located to the
left of aF;y in Figure 5, which can be directly used to prove the results of Part 2.
(3) bN <  < 1. Part 3 follows directly from that fact that bN  H for all 0s.
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